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THE WORLD COURT AND A WORLD
OPPORTUNITY

N

By Wayne C. Williams of the Denver Bar
O American can contemplate the World Court in its
beginnings without thinking of the beginnings of our
own Supreme Court in the early days of the republic.
Many analogies have been drawn between the two courts,
just as many have been successfully drawn between the beginnings of the Federal union of states and the early years of
the League of Nations.
While the historical and constitutional analogies, present
fascinating studies the one to be drawn here is largely personal.
Is there a John Marshall on the bench of the World
Court? Is a Marshall needed there and is the opportunity
presented by that court, its origin, purposes and powers,
sufficient to cause us to expect that such a man will emerge to
mould the decrees of that Court into a new world order
wherein all nations will come to a common forum for the
judicial settlement of their disputes?
John Jay declined the Chief Justiceship of the United
States Supreme Court saying, "I left the bench perfectly convinced that under a system so defective, it would not obtain
the energy, weight and dignity, which is so essential to its
affording due support to the National government, nor acquire public confidence and respect."
The task from which Jay shrank, apealed to John Marshall.
No weakling could have given permanent force to the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Marbury vs Madison or
McCullough vs Maryland. No inferior personality could
ever have persuaded his colleagues on the Bench to arrive at
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these monumental decisions. It was Marshall's personality
and gifts that made his great Work possible.
It is a mistake to think of Marshall as forcing any opinions on his colleagues for while he had a dominating personality and a disposition not easily swayed yet he united to these
firm qualities a modesty, a deference to the views of others, a
tender heart and a most convivial nature-all graced by a
pleasing manner that charmed his bitterest opponents. There
was no undue or frosty dignity about Marshall and precisely
these qualities, noted by so many of his contemporaries, will be
valuable equipment for any judge on any bench who must
match minds with colleagues.
Given then a great mind, a peculiar union of dominating
but pleasing personality, and given also a great opportunity,
we shall find history being made, as Marshall made it, and
we are quite prepared to believe Mr. Justice Story when he
said"When may we again hope to see so much moderation with so much
firmness; so much sagacity with so much modesty; so much learning with so
much piety; so much wisdom with gentleness."

Let us glance at .the superb constitutional structure erected by the Marshall decisions:1. Supremacy of the Federal government, its constitution and laws. Emphasized in Fletcher v Peck, (6 Cranch
87), and in McCullough vs. Maryland (4 Wheaton 316).
2. Power of Federal Supreme Court to interpret the
constitution and laws of the United States and to declare a
law unconstitutional. (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137).
3. State legislatures may not annul judgments of the
United States Courts. (Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87).
4. States may not tax instrumentalities of the Federal
government. (McCullough vs. Maryland).
5. The Federal government possesses inherent power to
function as a sovereign government and to do all things reasonable and necessary to function as such. (McCullough vs.
Maryland.)
6. The inviolability of all contracts. ("Dartmouth College case", 4 Wheaton 518).
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7. Power of the Supreme Court of the nation to pass
upon final judgments of state courts as to rights of all citizens
under Federal laws and the constitution. (Cohen vs Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264; a case that raised and decided fundamental principles and formed the whole distinction between
state and national legislatures and relative areas of power.)
8. The supreme power of the Federal government over
interstate commerce. (Gibbons vs Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1).
There are other great decisions but these are enough.
They clothed the nation with power and dignity and authority; they firmly established the nation's supremacy in its constitutional field and forever established the dignity and power
of the great court from which the decisions came.
The World Court faces a situation not unlike that which
faced Marshall on the American Supreme Bench. It is not
moulding a new world state and does not seek to and this fact
must ever be kept in mind as its decisions draw the nations
into closer and yet closer cooperation.
But only states can be parties before it and only international questions and rights arising out of international conventions, treaties and compacts, can be construed or enforced
by its decisions. It has separate nations, each sovereign in its
own right, to reconcile and never were nationalistic sentiments
or rights more strongly insisted upon than today. It is new
and its real powers are comparatively untried. It faces
hostility in many quarters of the world and in many nations
(not excepting our own) it faces the bitter opposition of certain eminent statesmen.
Sound reason was conspicuously a part of Marshall's
equipment and of his triumphs, and sound reason (always
good common sense juridically declared) will make the
World Court respected and adhered to.
The World Court does not directly touch the citizen, the
national, in his individual rights and capacities except as he is
an integral part of a greater whole-his nation.
The Court has yet to come into the consciousness of the
average national; yet to make its way with him and appeal
to his sense of justice and progress. But that is all coming.
Created on December 16th, 1920, under Article Fourteen
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of the League of Nations Covenant, the Court began with
these broad jurisdictional grants:"The Court shall be competent to hear and determine
any dispute of an international character which the parties
thereto submit to it."
The court may also give advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or Assembly of
the League.
The World Court has jurisdiction of all cases submitted to it by states, all cases under treaties or conventions,
and a wide jurisdiction under a special jurisdictional clause
for all nations accepting such jurisdiction and covering interpretation of treaties, questions of international law, existence
of any fact which constitutes a breach of international law and
the nature or extent of reparation to be made for any such
breach, and the interpretation of any court judgment.
In adjudicating and deciding matters before it the Court
may avail itself of, and apply international conventions and
established usages of member states, international custom,
general principles of law recognized by all nations, and judicial decisions and teaching of publicists.
Here is scope and power sufficient to mould the thoughts,
purposes and habits of the peoples of the world to a new international order. The breadth of it takes away the breath and
would be stimulating to any jurist, even without the vision
of a Marshall.
Let us take one single instance of interpretation that may
arise :-the preamble of the League covenant recites among
other things that it is formed to
"promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace
and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war."

The Kellogg Peace Treaty provides thatArt. 1.

"The high contracting powers solemnly declare . . . that they

condemn recourse to war and renounce it respectively as an instrument of
their national policy towards each other."

Here are two declarations renouncing war that must be
read together and that bring even America into the sweep of
the World movement for peace through a World Court, en-
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forcing and giving effect to the preamble of the League of
Nations.
Some Judge will be found who has courage and vision
and those powers of profound logic which will enable him to
chart the course of the nations, as he reads the charter of the
League and Court and applies them to some concrete case
before him.
We must not forget that Marshall was helped by other
unifying forces making for national cohesion and a stronger
central government, but he had neither the railroad nor telegraph .and none of those marvelous mechanical inventions that
have bound America into a unit.
The World Court starts with a physical and material
equipment between the nations that is far more effective in
moulding the peoples of the world together and clarifying
misunderstanding than had Marshall in his day.
The decisions of the Court can be known throughout the
civilized world in twenty-four hours after they are rendered.
The airplane and radio have obliterated international boundary lines and the voice of the Court itself could be heard
beyond the seas. There is, too, a new sense of international
unity in the world that scarcely existed among the states when
Marshall began his great career. There is a growing demand
for peace among all peoples and to that deepest impulse of
mankind the Court can, in future decisions, give form and
force and effect.
Why may we not look with confidence to the World Court
to forge the new links in the chain of brotherhood between
peoples of the earth?
Perhaps the statesman, the soldier and executive (with
all their commendable activity), may not solve this problem.
Why may we not expect a Court with its calm atmosphere,
its careful judicial process, its wise judgments, without heat
or haste, not based on the whims and caprices of the moment
or the wild notions of the mob-mind but sustained by judicially ascertained facts and ennobled by the highest reason and the
real hopes of mankind, to interpret the conflicting rights of
the nations so justly that even the hostile and defeated state
will accept the judgment; to keep all nations in their proper
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sphere and avoid all forces that seek to erect or maintain a
super state, by adjusting in delicate balance, the centripetal
and centrifugal forces that are operating in the world today;
to give small and weak states a forum into which they may
come with confidence and safety; to soundly interpret the
great charter of the League and Court and the solemn covenants of the nations to renounce war.
Here are tasks for many a Marshall.
Upon its decisions will rest the success not only of the
Court itself but the validity and value of the covenants that
have arisen since the world war.
When the nations and the peoples of the world are once
convinced that they have a forum that is more than a foruma Court-deciding with impartiality, with sound reasoning
and breathing a spirit of judicial integrity, then they will feel
about the World Court as Americans came to feel about the
court presided over by John Marshall.
This will then be a world of law-orderly, united; and
the process of civilization will have advanced a far step.

NOTE: At the request of various members of the Association, President John H. Denison-has appointed a'committee
to investigate the question of adhesion by the United States
to the World Court, which matter comes up soon before the
United States Senate for action. The committee consists of
L. Ward Bannister, Chairman, Will Shafroth, J. H. Pershing,
George F. Dunklee and Roger H. Wolcott. At the next meeting, Monday, January 13, Mr. Bannister will present the report of the committee, which should be of keen interest to all
members of the Association.

PROMOTERS' CONTRACTS
By Frank J. Mannix of the Denver Bar
HE development of systems of supervision and investigation as to the promotion of corporations, with a view
towards weeding out the unsound or the fraudulent,
may, to some extent, have tended to render the promoters of
corporations more conservative. The millennium, however,
is far from being at hand, and the day of the Western Surety
Company and kindred promotions is not yet a thing of the
past.. So long as there are persons of ability who are unprincipled in their methods and unduly technical in their
maneuvers, questions as to a corporation's rights and liabilities arising under a contract made with its promoters, or by
them with others, will continue to appear. It is to such questions that this paper will be briefly addressed.
The first question to be considered is as to what is a promoter. Generally he is one Who alone or with others takes it
upon himself to organize a corporation; to procure the necessary execution of the articles of incorporation, to file the articles with the proper officers and see that a certificate of incorporation is issued for the company. Ordinarily his work
terminates when the company has been organized and the
directors have taken over its affairs. It is a question of fact
and not of law as to when the promoter commences operations
as such, and when he ceases to be such. While he acts as a
promoter he occupies a fiduciary relationship towards the
corporation and also towards the subscribers to the company's
stock. It is important, therefore, to determine just when he
commences to be a promoter and just when he ceases to be
such. Quite frequently he may, after the organization of the
company, retain his character as a promoter, by dominating
the policies of the company, without being an officer or director thereof. In such cases he retains his rights and obligations
as a promoter.
In all cases where a corporation can be shown to have
become a party to a contract, made by or with its promoters,
the following circumstances must be shown by the pleading
and established by the evidence:

DICTA
1. The parties to the contract must have mutually expected that a
certain corporation was to be organized.
2. That the contract shows that it was to be with the company that
was expected to be organized.
3. That the organization would be such that the contract was one of
such a character as to be proper for the corporation to make under its powers,
as shown by its articles of incorporation.
4. That the persons who control the corporation were individually
acquainted with the material provisions of the contract, and
5. That after the corporation came into existence that it did perform
certain corporate acts that recognized the existence of the contract.

We will try to discuss these matters in their order:
Circumstance No. 1: It is hard to conceive of any case
coming up under the title of this thesis where much attention
must be given to this requirement. It needs no extended discussion. A mere statement of it as a circumstance required
to be pleaded is probably sufficient. The parties referred to
include the promoter or the promoters on one side and the
other contracting parties on the other side.
CircumstanceNo. 2: It is not required that the contract
show that it was made to be with the company in the exact
name under which it was actually organized, if in fact it was
the same corporation that was contemplated. This qualification of the rule is established in Colorado in a case decided
in 1894 by the Colorado Court of Appeals. It is the case of
the Colorado Land & Water Company vs. Adams, reported
in 5. C. A. 190. The facts in this case as stated in the opinion
were, in a general way, as follows: One Henry was soliciting
subscriptions for water rights in a corporation that he was
then contemplating organizing. The memorandum of the
contract with the plaintiff was a note made January 28, 1890.
A few days later the corporation was organized. Henry was
the president of the company and as such negotiated further
with the plaintiff in regard to the contract. The name of the
contemplated corporation, as stated in the memorandum was
'The Colorado Land & Canal Company". The corporation
as organized was "The Colorado Land & Water Company".
The court held that the difference in the name of the company
as organized was immaterial, that the Corporation that was
drganized was the one contemplated by the parties. It was
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a case of specific performance, and relief was granted to plaintiff.
Circumstance No. 3: This is a matter that does not require extended discussion. The forms of articles of incorporation as now in use are all so general in their powers that
it is only the exceptional case when the question, would arise
as to the lack of the authority of the company. However, it
is undoubtedly an essential averment to be made in the complaint on any case of this character.
Circumstance No. 4: This is one of the circumstances
which is more frequently discussed in such cases. The general rule is well established that the directors and officers of
a corporation are chargeable as said officers or directors with
the knowledge of facts that they each had individually as promoters of the company. It is clear, that those who control the
corporation after it has been formed bring the knowledge to
the corporation that they had as promoters. The knowledge
of the minority members of the board of directors or that of
some of the officers charged with the business, is not sufficient
to charge the corporation with knowledge. The assumption
of knowledge on the part of the corporation can only be sustained where the controlling force of the corporation has that
knowledge. In those cases where the controlling power of
the corporation is vested in persons who were not previously
promoters of the company, an entirely different situation
exists, then actuai knowledge of the individuals who are in
control of the affairs of the company, of all the material provisions of the contract must be shown before the corporation
can be considered a party to the contract.
There are some qualifications of the general rule that the
knowledge had by a promoter is imputed to the company by
reason of the fact that he later becomes a member of the board
of directors or an officer of the company. A corporation is
not charged with notice of facts known to the promoter in a
transaction between him and a corporation in which -he is
acting for himself and not for the corporation. The general
rule, that the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the principal, rests upon the presumption that the agent will disclose
what it is his principal's business to know and the agent's duty
to impart. Where the facts are such that by reason of the
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selfish interests of the promoter or for any other reason there
is an antagonism between the company and the promoter, thepl
the reason for the rule ceases and the rule fails.
Circumstance No. 5: This is the one circumstance that
is referred to in the greater majority of opinions on these cases.
The circumstance is that after the corporation comes into
existence that it did perform certain corporate acts that recognized the existence of the contract.
The general rule under this circumstance is as follows:
it is not essential to bind the corporation that a formal action
be taken by the officers and directors in approving the contract, to ratify it. Any conduct by those in charge of the company's affairs, or acts, deeds or correspondence that show the
company is interested in the contract and dealing therein is
sufficient to make the contract that of the company.
There is a Colorado case which has followed this general
rule in substance. It is the case of Possell vs. Smith, reported
in 39 Colo. 129. This was a case where corporate liability
was claimed on a contract with the promoters of a company
for the purchase of an air compressor. It does not appear in
the opinion as to whether delivery of the compressor was made
before or after the organization of the company nor does it
appear whether any of the promoters constituted the officers
or the directors of the company. The rule announced was
that, when the corporation used the compressor and the directors individually had knowledge of all the material facts regarding the contract, that the company was liable. It was also
held specifically that it was not necessary for the board of
directors in a body, or at a meeting assembled, to formally
adopt and ratify the contract in order to establish the liability
of the company. The facts showed that the company used the
compressor; that a majority of the directors of the company
knew all the material facts involved in the contract; and the
knowledge that they had, as individuals, of such facts, established the liability of the corporation.
There is another Colorado case which will undoubtedly
be of keen interest because it establishes the right of an attorney to fees charged for drafting the articles of incorporation of a corporation, and supervising the filing thereof. The
facts shown were that plaintiff had served as the attorney for
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the company for several years after it was organized. The
real point in issue before the Supreme Court was as to the
attorney's right to compensation for his services to the promoters. The court approved the rule that where the promoters and directors were the same persons after the corporation came into existence, that was in fact a ratification of the
promoters' contract of employment, and that no formal acts by
the board of directors or the officers of the company were
necessary to establish the company's liability on the contract.
The case referred to is Expansion Company vs. Campbell, 62
Colo. 410.
There is a line of cases wherein the courts have required
that a showing be made of actual corporate action of ratification, before the corporation can be considered to be a party to
the contract. This rule is laid down in Illinois, and was stated
in the case of Erd, et al., vs. Rapid Transit Corporation, and
reported in 206 Ill. App. 350. The opinion was handed down
in April, 1917. The matter involved attorney's fees for services rendered in perfecting the organization of the corporation, including the by-laws of the organization meeting, the
stockholders' meeting and that of the board of directors. The
evidence tended to show that the officers of the company and
the board of directors accepted the benefits of the plaintiff's
services. It appeared that the contract for the plaintiff's services was made with the promoters of the company and that
the same persons were thereafter the directors of the company,
and also that the company had received the full benefit of
plaintiff's services. The court took the position that as there
was no express corporate action specifically assuming the contract by the corporation that the corporation was not a party
to it. This is an extreme case and an exception to the general
rule established in other jurisdictions. It is the most extreme
case of this character that we have been able to find. The
court in deciding the case for the defendant corporation,
quoted with approval from 10 Cyc, 265, the following language:
"It is difficult to understand how the corporation is to be estopped by
accepting benefits it had no power to reject without uncreating itself."

The courts have done quite a bit of unnecessary theorizing
in order to state a good explanation of how a corporation can
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become a party to a contract which was made before the corporation came into existence. The frequency with which
this problem came up to the judiciary, and the equities that
were apparent in many of the cases, required that the rights
of persons who dealt with promoters in good faith should be
protected regardless of the theories upon which the protection was to be given.
Of the theories advanced to sustain the liability of a corporation upon contract of its promoters, the one stated in the
majority of the cases is that of ratification. This theory has
been the subject of very strong attacks both by the text writers
and the courts, and cannot be said to be an entirely satisfactory ground, however, it is the Colorado rule without any
criticisms or suggestions.
Another term that has met with more favor in describing what takes place when a corporation becomes liable upon
the contract made by a promoter is "Adoption". There is
little less objection to this term than there is to ratification, if
the contract has actually been effectuated between the promoter and the one seeking to enforce it, the strict principle of
contract, not to permit a third person to make himself a party
by mere adoption without any consideration flowing to or
from him, must be disregarded. The corporation can make
itself responsible for the acts and representations of a promoter by adoption. Adoption may be implied from the acts
or acquiescence of the corporation without any express acceptance. The corporation has knowingly received the benefit from the arrangement or understanding entered into by the
promoters, it will not be permitted to deny that it agreed to it.
There are numerous authorities in South Dakota, Texas, New
York, Minnesota, and in our own state in this regard.
There are two other grounds that have been suggested by
some Courts as the theory upon which the liability of a corporation upon a contract made with its promoters has been
sustained; the first of these is novation, that is that the corporation's liability is substituted for the liability of the promoter. The other is that the proposition made by the promoter was a continuing offer to be accepted or rejected by the
corporation when it came into being, and upon its acceptance,
becomes an original contract on its part. The theory of these
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last two grounds is material in affecting the personal liability
of the promoters. Neither of these grounds have been used
in, Colorado.
Much of the difficulty of this subject has resulted from the
fact that the first two grounds were the ones originally advanced, and that they were not strictly satisfactory, because it
was difficult, on scientific principles to see how a contract
made before a corporation came into being could be ratified
or adopted by it. On the other hand there was the injustice
and absurdity in denying liability of the corporation merely
because of the technicality that its incorporation so changed
the character of the operating forces which created the contract that it was not liable thereon, when the directing minds
continued to be the same after as before incorporation, and
all parties participating in the transaction intended and understood that the contract was to be that of the corporation.
The rule as to personal liability of a promoter for a contract made by him as such is governed by the general rules of
contracts. Presumably the contract is his. If he made it
with the general understanding that the contract was limited
to the corporation to be formed then he probably will escape
personal liability in regard to it. Only where the agreement is
specifically of that character will he escape personal liability.
Conceivably, there are circumstances where neither the
promoter or the corporation are liable on the contract sought
to be established. It is clear, however, that where the promoters of a company make a contract in the name of a proposed company, and thereafter fail to perfect the organization
of the company, then they are personally liable on the contract.
Every corporation formed must have its promoter. It
need not have a father and a mother, but it must have one of
them. Some person or persons must do the work required to
prepare the proper papers and obtain the articles of incorporation. In practically every case an attorney is employed
to perfect the incorporation. Other expenses must be incurred
before the corporation comes into existence. Fortunately in
nearly all of such cases there is no dispute about the discharge
of these expenses. It is only one case in a hundred where a
controversy comes up as to the payment of the expenses of incorporation. In each of these hundredth cases the same tech-
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nical question exists that the company before it is formed can
make no contracts, can incur no liabilities on a contract in its
name, and can claim no benefits by reason of such contract.
This discussion has been devoted almost in its entirety to the
questions as to the liabilities incurred under such contracts,
rather than the benefits obtained thereby. The reason for discussing the matter in such a way is that practically all of the
cases reported dealt with liabilities instead of benefits. The
contract in question, like all other contracts, works both ways.
The same rules apply whether the establishing of the contract will result in the imposition of liability or the bestowal
of a benefit.

RALPH FLEAGLE SHOULD HANG
By D. B. Kinkaid of the Denver and Lamar
Bar Associations

A

N article, by Mr. Philip Van Cise, appeared in the
November issue of Dicta, under the heading,
A"Should Ralph Fleagle Hang?" We will reply to
the question propounded by Mr. Van Cise, under the heading, "Ralph Fleagle Should Hang".
Mr. Van Cise advises executive clemency, i.e. that the
Governor of Colorado should disregard and set aside the findings of the jury, in the Fleagle case, and fix "life imprisonment" as the penalty; that the Governor should disregard the
law now extant in regard to determining the degree of punishment which should be allotted to the accused. With this position taken by Mr. Van Cise we cannot agree.
What the Governor will do, under the circumstances, we
do not know, but we have hope that he will enforce the law
as it now stands without fear or favor.
Ralph Fleagle has, and had, from the inception of the
cause, an able, learned attorney. Judge Cunningham knew,
and naturally so informed Ralph Fleagle, that an oral promise
that he would receive "life imprisonment only" was absolutely valueless; that there was no power under our statute to enforce the same.
Did Ralph Fleagle confess because of the alleged oral
promise of clemency? Did he do so purely and alone because
he had received the alleged oral promise that he would only
be given a sentence of life imprisonment?
Mr. Harper, the detective employed by the Bankers'
Association, testified at the trial of Fleagle that he secured the
confession from Fleagle when he showed him a telegram
which he had prepared to send to a Criminologist in California, employing him in the case; that Ralph Fleagle knew
the Criminologist and feared him and then, and then only,
agreed to confess, provided the Criminologist was not employed.
That fact has been practically lost sight of and been overshadowed by the glamour of a more appealing matter, towit,
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an alleged promise. It cannot be justly claimed that the only
cause which moved Fleagle to make the confession was the
"promise", the terms of which are in dispute. There was in
addition to the above, a promise which has been kept, to the
effect that his brothers and father would not be prosecuted.
There were perhaps other moving causes which caused him to
make the confession, of which we do not know and never will
know, for the reason that they are hidden in the breasts of
Ralph Fleagle and his family. It does not appeal to us to be
logical to assume, or presume, that Ralph Fleagle made the
confession purely for the reason that an alleged promise, that
he would receive a sentence of life imprisonment only, was
made.
It has been, and is claimed, that the confession of Ralph
Fleagle saved the lives of four innocent men. That is questionable. We feel safe in asserting that no jury in Prowers
County or in any other county in the state would have convicted Whitey Walker et al. after the finger print of Jake
Fleagle, connecting the Fleagles with the case, had been discovered. We do not believe that our District Attorney would
have attempted to convict Walker et al. after the finger print
of Jake Fleagle had been found.
The testimony, in regard to the so called agreement as
to life imprisonment or hanging, was decidedly conflicting.
Mr. Harper, testifying for the defense, alleged that a positive
assurance was given Fleagle that he would only receive life
imprisonment. Two or three others also testified to like effect,
yet testimony was also given by equally credible witnesses to
the effect that the agreement was only that the prosecutor
would not "ask" for the death penalty. All this evidence was
placed before the jury and it found against Fleagle. Should
their finding be disturbed?
Mr. Van Cise claims that the prosecuting officers and
police officials of our state must "dicker and deal" with criminals; that otherwise we will not secure convictions. That is
a matter for our legislative bodies. The Fleagle case should
be conducted in accordance with the law now extant and not
in accordance with what some one or more individuals think
the law should be. The same claim made by Mr. Van Cise
was made by Mr. Harper in his testimony before the Fleagle
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jury, although it was purely argumentative, yet the jury found
that Fleagle should hang.
Mr. Van Cise alludes to the fact that no identification
or attempted identification was made by the prosecution in the
trial of Ralph Fleagle. No identification was necessary under
the plea of guilty entered by Fleagle. What identification
might or might not have been made of Ralph Fleagle is beside
the point in question.
Mr. Van Cise further claims that the evidence against
Ralph Fleagle prior to the confession was purely circumstantial. That may or may not be true, but, is it not just as
reasonable to assume that Ralph Fleagle believed that there
would be more than circumstantial evidence adduced? Ralph
Fleagle knew what could have been discovered against him,
in connection with the murder and robbery, and the confession was made by him with a clear understanding of the consequences. He and his attorney knew that the promise, if such
promise were made, of a life imprisonment sentence only,
meant nothing. They knew that the degree of punishment
must be left to a jury, not then selected. Great care was taken
by counsel for the defense in the selection of the jury.
Mr. Van Cise further states as follows, to-wit:
"Under the Statutes (C.L. 6665) the jury alone and no one else can
fix the penalty for first degree murder! No outside agency of any kind can
interfere with this exclusive prerogative."

This appears to us to dispose of the whole matter. Ralph
Fleagle must hang, in accordance with the verdict of the jury,
or our statutes must be disregarded. No "outside agency"
should interfere.
The only way in which Ralph Fleagle can escape the
penalty of death, imposed by the jury, is to have or secure some
"outside agency" to circumvent the statutes in regard to this
matter.
It is true some states have statutes authorizing contracts
between the State and the defendant, but Colorado has no such
statute.
Mr. Van Cise further says:
"Oral agreement between the State and the defendant, without the
approval of the Court.
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"Such an arrangement is of no value whatever in Colorado, affords
no protection to the defendant, and cannot be offered in evidence. It also is
dangerous, as it opens the door of misunderstanding."

As the alleged agreement made with Ralph Fleagle was
made without the "approval of the Court", it appeals to us that
the above statement made by Mr. Van Cise is controlling; that
there should be no further quibbling or reference made to the
alleged agreement and that the decision of the jury should be
strictly adhered to and carried out.
We agree with Mr. Van Cise in his statement that evidence as to the so called agreement could not legally have been
forced into the testimony, but the prosecuting officers in their
desire to deal absolutely fairly in every respect with the defendant, Fleagle, permitted the evidence thereof to go to the
jury and the evidence in regard to the agreement was full
and complete.
Mr. Van Cise quotes a decision from our Supreme Court
as follows, to-wit:
"We are not aware that the District Attorney has the power to suspend
the operation of a statute or to make a valid agreement by which he is to refrain from enforcing the criminal laws of the State * * * proof of such an
agreement, if made, was improper."

Under that decision of our Supreme Court, why should
the alleged agreement made by the District Attorney be given
any consideration whatsoever?
Our deductions from the facts and premises laid are as
follows:
First: Ralph Fleagle was convicted by a jury of twelve
men (one peremptory challenge remaining to the defense) of
the murder of the President of the First National Bank and
his son, the Cashier thereof, and robbery of said bank.
Second: No judicial or executive clemency should be
allotted Ralph Fleagle.
Third: Ralph Fleagle should be hanged as ordered by
the jury.
Fourth: That which cannot be done directly under the
statute should not be done by indirection, circumlocution or
circumvention thereof.

FURTHER COMMENTS re FLEAGLE'S
CASE*
Editors of Dicta,
Denver, Colorado.
Gentlemen:
Since writing the article "Should Ralph Fleagle Hang"
in the November Dicta, I have received a letter from Judge
Cunningham, counsel for Fleagle, extracts of which should be
of interest to the legal fraternity in connection with the case.
"*

* * at the time the agreement was entered into, the district at-

torney was present and participated actively in the same. * * * he stated
that he had consulted with both of the judges of his district (not knowing
which of the two might try the case) and that both judges had urged him
to enter into the agreement.
That there may be no doubt that Mr. Erickson made this statement, I
desire to quote from the testimony given by Chief Harper while on the stand
as a witness called by the defendant, which testimony was not denied nor was
there any attempt made to deny it.
The following questions were propounded to Chief Harper and he
made the following answers thereto:
'Q. Now state just what transpired, beginning with the opening of
the meeting?
A. As I recall, you (meaning the writer) wasn't present in the room
at our first conference. I informed the gentlemen present of our negotiations
so far as we had gone; and informed them that I believed we was in a fair
way to get a complete confession from Ralph Fleagle, clearing up this whole
affair.
Q. At that point, before going further, may I interrupt you with a
question: Had you at that time, in your judgment, sufficient evidence to have
convicted Ralph Fleagle of this bank robbery?
A. We did not.
Q. What was your belief as to his connection with it at that time?
A. At that time we weren't certain that Ralpf Fleagle participated
in this bank robbery but we believed that he knew all about it.
Q. And when you say, "we", who do you include in that?
A. Sheriff Aldermann (of Prowers County), Mr. Erickson (the
district attorney), Mr. Hemming (the banker), and the others.
Q. All right. Now, having stated that you didn't have the evidence.
*Editor's Note: These comments were received by letter from Mr. Van Cise
after his November article had gone to press. The letter is printed in full and,
together with Mr. Kinkaid's article in this issue, throws a further sidelight upon a
vexed question.
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A. That part may be, I can only answer for myself, but I believed at
that time that Ralph Fleagle, if he didn't actually participate in the bank
robbery, knew all of the facts.
Q. Well, you and Mr. Alderman were certainly in accord upon that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And Mr. Erickson, or could you speak for him?
A. Up to that time I hadn't gone into details closely with Mr.
Erickson regarding Fleagle, except over the telephone; I had several conversations over the telephone with Mr. Erickson.
Q. There had been no action filed against Mr. Fleagle at that time,
had there?
A. I believe there had in the justice court here.
Q. All right. Proceed now with your conference.
A. Two or three days before this conference, I don't recall the exact
time, Mr. Erickson and I had called each other on numerous occasions and
had talked regarding the securing of a confession from Ralph Fleagle. Mr.
Erickson informed me that he didn't like the idea of having to deal with one
of these men, but it looked to him as though it was our only way out. But
consistently refused to make such a deal until he had consulted with both
district judges of this district, Judge Hollenbeck and Judge McChesney, as I
recall his name. He informed me that before he would come to Colorado
Springs on any such a mission he must consult with them, and get their ideas.
At the meeting in Colorado Springs, Mr. Erickson there informed me of his
conversation with the two district judges, and the outcome of it.
Q. What did he say, what outcome did he relate to you?
A. Mr. Erickson informed me that both district judges urged him to
make a deal with Ralph Fleagle, in order to clear this case up completely.
Q. What did he say his attitude of mind was at that time?
A. He believed it was necessary to do so.'
* * * upon the day the agreement was entered into, the district attorney stated that on several occasions, to his personal knowledge, defendants
charged with murder in Las Animas County who had made confessions were
given a life sentence on pleading guilty to second degree murder and that the
judge presiding had instructed the juries to return such verdict. The district
attorney called attention to one case tried in that county in which, notwithstanding such instruction the jury had returned its verdict wherein the penalty
was fixed at death, but that in the case just mentioned the proceeding was
declared a mistrial and a new jury was empaneled, the case tried, the jury
instructed, and a life sentence returned.
I am also inclosing an instruction which the court actually gave.
'Gentlemen of the Jury, it has developed in this case, as you probably
have observed, that there is some difference of opinion between the District
Attorney and one of the attorneys for the defendant, touching the terms and
conditions of the agreement mentioned in the evidence. Such differences after
a considerable lapse of time, are not unusual, and they do not indicate to the
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court's mind bad faith upon the part of anyone connected with said agreement.
As the court views the entire circumstances surrounding the agreement aforesaid, this difference of opinion seems to be more apparent than real. The
defendant and his attorney, I think it may be fairly assumed from the evidence,
believe the promise to be that the former would not receive the death penalty,
and, so believing the defendant made his confession which fully cleared up the
mystery surrounding the tragedy in which he took part, and has brought to
the bar of this court three of the four parties guilty of it, and disclosed the
identity of the fourth party. You are further instructed that evidence of such
compact and confession, and matters incident thereto, are circumstances to be
taken into consideration by you in determining what punishment should be
fixed by you and your verdict if you find the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree.' "

Res ipsa loquitur!

In this connection it is interesting to observe the recent
conduct of the district attorney and district judge at Craig,
Colorado, when Raymond Gray was convicted of first degree
murder with life imprisonment as the punishment. Gray confessed, according to the district attorney, with the understanding that the penalty would "go light".
Judge Charles E. Herrick instructed the jury,
"* * * if you believe that he confessed, acting under the impression
that he had been promised he would not receive the supreme penalty, then I
say our word should be as good as our bond. We should keep faith."

The district attorney, the district judge and the jury are
to be congratulated on their enforcement of the law in Craig.
Yours very truly,
PHILIP S. VAN CISE

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EnrroR's Nore.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note interesting decisions
of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County Court, and
occasionally the Juvenile Court.)

DISTRICT COURT-No. 103249-Div. 4-L. V.
Baugher, et al, vs. City and County of Denver, et al.-Hon.
Henry Bray, Judge-Decided November 23, 1929.
Facts.-One of defendants was a police officer of the City
and County of Denver. On the day of the accident he had
been ordered by his superior to go to his home, put on his
uniform and report to the City Hall for duty. While driving
to the City Hall in, an automobile owned by the City, he
collided with a car in which the plaintiff was riding. As a result, plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff sues the police
officer and the City and County of Denver for damages on the
ground of negligence. Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff
on the ground of negligence.
Held.-I. Judgment entered against the police officer.
2. Directed verdict in favor of the City and County of
Denver.
The City and County of Denver is engaged in two kinds
of activities-governmental and ministerial. The police
officer in this instance was acting as an administrative officer
for the city in its governmental capacity. The city is not
liable for the torts of its agent while acting in a governmental
capacity.
DENVER

DISTRICT COURT-No. 107127-Div. 2-Young
Women's Christian Association of Denver vs. Clem W.
Collins - Hon. J. C. Starkweather, Judge - Decided
November, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff,a charitable organization, is the owner
of certain lots and building thereon in the City and County of
Denver. A portion of this building is used and occupied as a
cafeteria. The cafeteria is operated solely by the plaintiff
association. Meals are served at a profit to the general public.
However, the gross receipts of the cafeteria are turned over to
the general fund of the association from which fund all disbursements are made, including the expenses of operation of
DENVER
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the cafeteria. Any profits derived from the operation are used
for charitable purposes. A large portion of the general fund
of the association is obtained annually by popular subscription. Plaintiff association in order to carry out its charitable
work maintained a number of clubs for business and industrial girls. These clubs met weekly or oftener, the meetings
being held at dinner time and meals served to the girls attending at less than cost.
Article 10 Section 5 of the Constitution of Colorado provides "lots with the buildings thereon, if said buildings are
used solely and exclusively for religious worship, for schools
or strictly charitable purposes, shall be exempt from taxation
unless otherwise provided by general law."
Compiled laws 1921 Section 7198, Section 2, provides
"the following classes of property shall be exempt from general taxation, to-wit:-Fourth-Lots with the buildings
thereon, if said buildings are used for strictly charitable purposes."
Defendant allowed an exemption for all but 13.7% of
building and lots for the year 1928 which he segregated, this
being the proportionate part of the building occupied by the
cafeteria and assessed taxes on said building and lots for said
segregated portion of 13.7%.
Plaintiff in this action prays for an injunction to prevent
the advertising and selling of this property for said taxes.
Held.-The cafeteria falls within the exemptions from
taxation as provided in Article 10 Section 5 of the Constitution
and Section 7198 of the Compiled Laws of 1921.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has always given a very
liberal construction of the above provisions. The evidence
shows that whatever net profit, if any, derived from the operation of this cafeteria would be disbursed for charitable purposes along with other funds of the association. The evidence
further shows that thru the system of clubs used to promote the
general purpose of the association, meals were furnished by
the cafeteria below cost to many girls who could not otherwise
have purchased meals or participated in the activities of the
association. Therefore, the cafeteria was used for charitable
purposes.
Injunction Made Permanent.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR'S NoTL-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-No.

12471

-Cherokee Realty Company vs. Allen-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Allen had judgment against defendant for services rendered in effectuating the exchange of real estate belonging to plaintiff below. The plaintiff alleged that the compensation was to be paid in cash while the defendant alleged
another method of payment.
Held.-The evidence upon the only question in dispute
was in sharp conflict; there was competent evidence before
the Court upon which to base his judgment, and under the
well established and oft announced decisions of this Court,
we are not at liberty to disturb it.
Judgment Affirmed.
People vs. Lindsey - No.
DISBARMENT 12130-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Lindsey, while Juvenile Judge and also while
still holding a license as attorney at law, accepted $37,500
from Mrs. Stokes and $10,000 from Samuel Untermyer, New
York attorney, as the result of a contest instituted by Mrs.
Stokes as guardian of her two minor children to set aside the
will of their father in the State of New York. The contest resulted in a settlement whereby certain shares of stock were
secured of great value. Proceedings with reference to the
guardianship of the persons of these minors were at that time
pending in the Juvenile Court, without having been finally
closed. With the knowledge of the Juvenile Judge and at his
instigation, proceedings were had in the County Court of
Denver to have Mrs. Stokes appointed as guardian of the
estate of said minors, a petition was filed therein stating that
there was not sufficient cash in the estate and it was necessary
to borrow money on the stock belonging to the minors in order
ATTORNEYS -
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to pay certain local parties for services. An order was entered
granting such permission. The certain local parties was the
respondent, Lindsey. The respondent claimed first that the
$37,500 and the $10,000 were a gift and were not for services
as an attorney; and second that the contest over the Will, being
in the State of New York, had no reference to any legal services or litigation in the State of Colorado over which this
Court would have jurisdiction.
Held.-Lindsey rendered legal services and not mere
services of a friend, mediator, or arbitrator. The money was
paid.to him for legal services and not as a gift. An essential
element of a gift is an intention of the donor to bestow something on the donee voluntarily and without any consideration
whatever. In the instant case, Lindsey gave a receipt in full
for the moneys received by him. Gifts are exempt from the
imposition of any income tax under the laws of the United
States, yet the respondent, in his income tax, returned the
amount received as income received. Respondent was false to
his oath taken as a judicial officer, and also false to his oath as
an attorney and counselor at law, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust imposed in him by this Court.
Judgment entered that respondent be removed from the
office of attorney and counselor at law and his license revoked.
AUTOMOBILES -

LAST

CLEAR

CHANCE -

PLEADING -

No.

12182-Bragdon vs. Hexter-Decided November 12, 1929.

Facts.-Personal injury action by Hexter against Bragdon. The trial Court introduced into the case for the first
time by its instructions, the Last Clear Chance doctrine. The
same was not pleaded by the plaintiff either in his complaint
or replication. In the answer, the defendant alleged that
plaintiff was guilty of carelessness and negligence. Plaintiff
simply filed general denial.
Held.-When the defendant specifically alleged in the
answer that plaintiff was guilty of negligence that directly
contributed to the accident, and plaintiff filed replication consisting of a denial, plaintiff may not avail herself of the Last
Clear Chance doctrine. If plaintiff desired to avail herself of
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this doctrine, she must affirmatively plead facts showing that
the last clear chance doctrine was applicable.
Judgment Reversed.
BANKS-CHECKS--D EPOSITS-Bro o mfield vs. Cochran-No.

12304-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Defendants issued a check to Cochran drawn on
the International Trust Company. The check was endorsed
and deposited in defendant's account at the Broadway National Bank. The drawee was permitted by the bank to draw
against the check after its deposit. Payment was stopped on
the check and the receiver of the bank brought suit against
the makers to cover the amount paid out by the bank. Judgment for defendant in the Court below.
Held.-Where a check is drawn on one bank and unconditionally deposited in another, the latter becomes merely an
agent of the depositor and title does not pass to said bank; but
if the bank of deposit extends credit and permits the depositor
to withdraw the amount of the check, the bank becomes the
owner thereof.
Judgment Reversed.
BILLS AND NOTES-BONA FIDE HOLDER-CONSIDERATION.-

No. 11940-Schwalb and Cannon vs. Riel-Decided
November 12, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffs sued defendant on two counts to recover on two promissory notes. Defendant interposed two
defenses alleging no consideration, payment, and estoppel.
The Court refused to instruct verdict for plaintiffs.
Held.-The undisputed evidence discloses that a valuable
consideration was paid for the notes and that there was no
payment by set-off, or otherwise, and that the defendants are
not estopped to assert that they are bona fide holders for value
in good faith, and without notice of any infirmity in said notes.
The lower Court should have directed a verdict for the plaintiffs.
Judgment Reversed.

DICTA
BROKERS'

LICENSE-CONTRACTS-No.

12420-Black Forest

Realty & Investment Co. vs. Clarke-DecidedNovember
25, 1929.
Facts.-The Realty Company employed Clarke as its
general sales manager to have supervision of all sales of lots
owned by the Company. Clarke was to receive a salary, plus
five per cent. of the purchase price on sales. He recovered
judgrent below; defense was that he had no real estate brokers' license. This issue was not tendered until day of trial
and Court denied application to amend.
Held.-It was not necessary for Clarke to have a brokers'
license. He was merely an employe of the Company. The
proposed amendment presented no defense, but if it were
otherwise, the delay in applying for leave to amend would
justify the Court in denying the application.
Judgment Afflrmed.
CONTRACTS-TIME

NOT

ESSENCE

OF

CONTRACT-Kitt

vs.

Runge-No. 12187-DecidedDecember 9, 1929.
Facts.-Parties below entered into a contract to exchange
certain lands, exchange to be made on October 1st, 1'927. Exchange could not be completed on the date specified because
there was a mortgage against one of the pieces of land, and
the holder of the mortgage delayed in executing the release
through no fault of the owner of the land. Time was not
specifically mentioned as being of the essence of the contract.
Court below granted specific performance.
Held.-Time is not of the essence of a contract, unless
it is made so, either specifically or by the circumstances of the
case.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFIDENCE GAME-BILL OF PARTICULARS

-12343-Stewart vs. People-Decided Dec. 2, 1929.
Facts.-Stewart was convicted of an attempt to obtain
money from an insurance company by means of the confidence
game. He filed claim against an insurance company for theft
of two wheels, tires and tubes. Upon investigation the alleged
stolen property was found hidden on his premises. Stewart
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introduced no evidence in defense. He asked for a bill of
particulars.
Held.-It is within sound discretion of the lower court
to grant or deny motion for bill of particulars in a criminal
case. The evidence justified conviction.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEEDS-RESERVATION OF MINERALS-SURFACE RIGHTS--NO.

12203-Whiles vs. The Grand Junction Mining and Fuel
Company-Decided November 12, 1929.
Facts.-PlaintiffWhiles is owner of irrigated lands by
virtue of divers mesne conveyances from the Union Pacific
Railroad Company. The Railroad Company reserved minerals and coal underlying the surface. Defendant is lessee of
the Railroad Company of the coal underlying Plaintiff's land.
Action was for injunction to restrain defendant from entering
upon or mining coal.
Held.-Impossible to mine coal in such a way as to leave
sufficient support for the surface. Defendant may not remove
coal unless it furnishes a statutory indemnity bond to protect
tfie plaintiff in surface rights. Defendant restrained until such
bond is furnished although surface owner is not obliged to ask
for a bond, nevertheless, if bond is offered sufficient to protect
the surface owner, the Court may permit further mining
operations by requiring a bond that will cover all damages
that the surface owner may suffer.
Judgment Affirmed.
DIVORCE-ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE-No. 12164-Sarah A.

Tierney vs. M. E. Tierney-Decided October 14, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff below (plaintiff in error) brought an
action for divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law
in her favor were entered. About four months thereafter she
filed a petition asking that the suit be dismissed. Defendant
resisted this petition and thereafter the Court entered a decree
of divorce in favor of plaintiff, but over her protest.
Held-This case is governed by Walton v. Walton, 278
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Pac. 780, which held that a guilty party may not obtain a decree of divorce over the objection of the successful party.
Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
INJUNCTION - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-REPLEVIN-LEGAL
AND EQUITABLE RELIEF-No. 12204-Mosco vs. Jeannot-

Decided November 25, 1929.
Facts.-Mosco, through her next friend, brought action
against defendants asking for an injunction, and at the same
time asking for damages and for a body judgment, on the
grounds that defendants were conducting a voting contest
whereby the one receiving the largest number- of votes was to
win an automobile and the plaintiff alleged that she had the
largest number of votes, but that defendants awarded the automobile to one, Martinez, one of the defendants, contrary to
the rules of the contest. Demurrer to the complaint was sustained below.
Held.-Plaintiff below mistook her remedy. She should
have brought an action in the nature of replevin to recover
her automobile, and if she was entitled to it, it would have
been awarded to her by the Court. The facts pleaded present
no case for injunctive relief, nor for specific performance of
contract.
Judgment Affirmed.
INTOXICATING

LIQUORS-SUFFICIENCY

OF

EVIDENCE-No.

12453-Wilkins vs. The People-DecidedOctober 28,1929.
Facts.-The Defendant below was convicted of a second
offence in violation of the intoxicating liquor statute. The
sole question on which defendant relies for reversal of the
judgment is the insufficiency of the evidence.
Held.-There was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
to the testimony was exclusively for the jury, and the jury
found the defendant "guilty".
Judgment Jffirmed.
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LIBEL-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION-MALICE-Walker vs.
Hunter-No. 12272-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Walker sued Hunter and others for libel on account of matters contained in a petition to the County Commissioners to close a certain dance hall. In the complaint the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants falsely, maliciously, and
with intent to injure and prejudice the plaintiff, published the
libel, and that the same was false and was known by the defendants to be false, and that the defendants were guilty of
malice and wilful deceit in the matter. Court below sustained
a demurrer to the complaint.
Held.-The complaint sufficiently charged express
malice. The demurrer should have been overruled.
Judgment Reversed.
PHYSICIANS-OSTEOPATHY-No. 12237-Newton vs. Board
of County Commissioners-Decided November 25, 1929.
Facts.-Newton has state license to practice medicine as
an Osteopathic Physician, and seeks to enjoin the enforcement
by the Board of a practice barring Osteopathic physicians
from practising in two county hospitals maintained by the
Board. The District Court sustained a general demurrer.
Held.-A physician has no constitutional or statutory
right to practice his profession in a county hospital. The
county board has complete supervision and control. A regulation excluding from the county hospital, or the right to
practice therein, the devotees of some of the numerous systems or methods of treating diseases authorized to practice
the profession in Colorado, is neither unreasonable or arbitrary.
Judgment Affirmed.
PLEADING-ABUSE OF-NEXT FRIEND-NO. 12,281-Ellis v.

Colorado National Bank-Decided October 28, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff, who was apparently insane, but has
never been judicially declared to be such was given permission by the Court below to bring suit by next friend on the
ground that defendants were depriving him of his property
by taking advantage of his mental disorder. Ellis' motions
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were filed in the Court below, and the plaintiff standing on
the complaint, the same was taken. to the Supreme Court,
which sustained the complaint and remanded the cause with
directions to overrule the motions and proceed in harmony
with the opinion. Instead of promptly proceeding with the
discussion of the pleadings and getting the case to issue, various motions and demurrers were filed by the defendant. The
Courf below sustained a demurrer on the ground that the
plaintiff could not sue by next friend, but only in person or
by a conservator.
' Held.-Plaintiff not having been judicially declared insane should have been permitted by the Court below in its
discretion to sue by next friend. The repeated reversal of
its rulings by the trial Court after long delays, amounted to
such an abuse of discretion as to defeat the very purpose of
that discretion. All motions and demurrers, if practicable,
should be filed at the same time, and the trial should not be
turned into a tournament of pleading, rather than a trial of
substance.
Judgment Reversed.
RAPE-MENTAL

INCOMPETENCE-WIFE

TESTIFYING-No.

12441-Wilkinson vs. People-DecidedNovember 4, 1929.
Facts.-Wilkinson was convicted of the crime of rape.
Wilkinson was the step-father of the victim, and his wife,
the mother of the victim, and the victim was a dwarf, twentyfour years of age with the mentality of a ten-year old child.
Wife of defendant was permitted to testify as to her name,
but was not interrogated further.
Held.-1. Wife is competent to testify against her husband where he is charged with rape against his step-daughter,
who is the real daughter of the wife. 2. The victim was
competent to testify, and whether or not she possessed sufficient
mental capacity to give her legal consent was a question of fact
for the jury. 3. If defendant relies upon improper conduct,
or suggestions by the District Attorney, or others interested in
the prosecution they should immediately be called to the at-
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tention of the trial court, and if not, it is too late to complain in
the Supreme Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
REAL ESTATE BROKER-COMMISSION-No.
Podd-Decided October 28, 1929.

12459-Ness vs.

Facts.-Poddwas a licensed real estate broker, and Ness
listed said real estate with him for sale at $2850. The broker
obtained a prospective purchaser who was pleased with the
property, but wanted to get a reduction in price. Two weeks
later, Ness sold the same property through another broker to
the same prospective purchaser for a less price.
Held.-The broker was entitled to his commission for
the sale. The law will not permit one broker who has been
entrusted with the sale of land, and is working with a customer
whom he has found, to be deprived of his commission by
another agent steppling in and selling to the customer for a
price less than the first broker is impowered to receive.
Judgment Affirmed.
SALES-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-NEGATIVE PREGNANT-No.

12,463-Everett vs. Cole-Decided November 4, 1929.
Facts.-Cole claimed he sold Everett seven hundred
pounds of buffalo bull meat at fifty cents per pound, for which
the latter refused to pay. Defendant claimed he was not a
purchaser, but plaintiff's agent to sell on commission, and
that through no fault of his, nothing was sold; hence, that he
owed nothing. Verdict below for plaintiff for the full
amount. Cole, a member of the bar, accustomed to "throwing
the bull", was the owner of a certain buffalo bull, highly educated, having attained the degree of B.S., but notwithstanding
this, was wild and fractious which resulted in his summary
execution,* and what was left of the bull, after stripping him
of his honors, was delivered to Everett who hung him up in
his butcher shop, but before any of the meat was sold, it was
*Note: The italics are those of the Editor-in-Chief who admits himself greatly
impressed by this rather novel, yet highly commendable, ground for executing an
attorney.
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condemned by a food inspector who belonged to the "Bull
Moose" party.
Held.-The evidence was competent, material, and relevant, and sufficient to support the verdict for plaintiff. The
instructions fairly state the law. There was no objection taken
to the instructions, but because defendant's counsel had made
objections at a former trial and also at his motion for a new
trial, recited the objections, he claimed that he could assert
the objections here. Rules of the Supreme Court require that
specific objections be made to proposed instructions before
such instructions are given to the jury. No waiver of a failure
to comply with that rule can be binding in the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the answer was a perfect negative pregnant
throughout; hence, the allegations of the complaint stand
admitted.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISABILITY-STATUTORY

CON-

12,347-New York Indemnity Company
vs. Industrial Commission and Carl Robinson-Decided
October 14, 1929.
Facts.-Robinson sustained an injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment, which caused the loss of his
right arm near the elbow and a ninety per cent loss of the left
arm. The Commission awarded him compensation for total
and permanent disability. Thereafter Robinson himself obtained employment and the Indemnity Company brought suit
to reduce the award under Sec. 4451 C. L. 1921, which defines total disability as the loss of both hands, etc., except
where the employer or the Commission obtains suitable employment for the disabled person.
Held.-Robinson having obtained his own employment,
this case does not come within the statutory exception, and his
compensation is continued.
Judgment Affirmed.
STRUCTION-No.

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-NONRESIDENT

EMPLOYEE-

No. 12428-Plattvs. Reynolds-Decided October 28, 1929.
Facts.-Plattwas engaged in the automobile business in

DICTA

Denver, and carried Liability Insurance under the Colorado
Workmen's Compensation Act. Reynolds was an employee of
Platt, but resided in Nebraska, and carried on his entire business in, Nebraska. He was killed in Nebraska.
Held.-The Colorado Compensation Act does not apply
to one employed by a Colorado Company where the employee
contracts to work in another state and is actually injured in
another state. The Commission could exercise no jurisdiction
over that employment or its conditions. Its protection could
not reach that employee there nor could our Courts adjudicate
his controversies.
Judgment Reversed.
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